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Did International Law really become a Science
at the End of the 19th Century ?
Introduction
I have chosen this title because of my familiarity with the projects at the Max
Planck Institute for European Legal History (MPIeR) on the history of
international law which was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft (DFG) since Michael Stolleis put forward a bid in 1997; a new MPIeR-
project on “Theory and Practice of International Law, 1789–1914” has started
in 2007 in the context of the DFG-funded Frankfurt Cluster of Excellence
“The Formation of Normative Orders” and was one of the cooperation-
partners of the Lecce conference in 2009. The introductory program of this
conference says that “international law as a legal discipline and a scientific
knowledge was born in the 19th century … the process through which the
international law became a science, different from the diplomacy or the natural
law started only in the second half of the 19th century”.
The program states that the alternatives at that time were “a confused
philosophy or a simple comment of the diplomatic practice”. The discipline
required the positivisation of the law, with the states as the subjects of new
knowledge, but still having to seek general principles necessary for a world
wide legal science. It was not possible for international law to be a science and
also be merely a product of the will of states. In particular international law
science had to mediate between universalism and nationalism and maybe
humanitarian aspirations and colonial impulses etc.
International lawyers were to develop an organic relationship with the
conscience of civilized nations, as an elite group of intellectuals but at the
same time international law would be a positive law based on the conscience
of humanity, and expressed by public opinion. The role of the international
lawyers was “to interrogate the conscience”.
The program of this last paragraph corresponds very much to the
manifesto of the Institut de Droit International set up in 18731 and it does
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1 See in particular, Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 for a full account of this event,
not exactly correspond to the first paragraph which is closer to a summary of
the issues which dominated German and Austrian international law doctrine
in the years before the First World War.2 Obvious differences are that the state
does not figure in the last paragraph, while the former is dominated by the
question of the state, effectively as an expression of organized nationalism and
the problems that poses for universalism and the possibility of an objective
law above the will of the state.
The fourth paragraph of the first page of the conference aims does foreclose
the outcome of the conference deliberations because it stipulates that the
objective is “to understand how international law has become a science
during the mid-nineteenth century”. The organizers want to be as liberal as
possible in inviting the participants to develop this agenda and have happily
accepted a title from myself, which has the pretension to challenge this
objective by asking whether there is anything very usefully achieved by saying
that international law has become a science.
A difficulty in taking up such a challenge surrounds the concept of
“science” itself. It is presumably a translation of the German word
Wissenschaft. One might go for an Italian title of the conference, which is,
presumably, literally translated into English, “the construction of a
2 Did International Law really become a Science at the End of the 19th Century ?
chapter 1, 39 et seq. See also, the author’s “Changing Models of the Inter-
national System”, in: William Butler (ed.), Perestroika and International
Law, The Hague: Kluwer 1990, 13–40, and also, by the author, The
Philosophy of International Law, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
2007, at 50–59. I argue that Habermas’s theory of communicative action
might be used to revitalize the Institute’s project, while Koskenniemi is more
skeptical in the light of the events of the 20th century.
2 This is a huge subject which is only beginning to be researched seriously. Apart
from Koskenniemi (n. 1), see in particular the work of Lauri Mälksoo, The
Science of International law and the Concept of Politics. The Arguments and
Lives of the International Law Professors at the University of Dorpat/Tartu
1855–1985, in: BYIL 76 (2005) 283 and id., The Context of International
Legal Arguments. Positivist International law Scholar August von Bulmerincq
(1822–1890) and his Concept of Politics, in: JHIL 7 (2005) 181. The
argument of the present paper will continue to be the one first advanced by
the author in The Decay of International Law, Manchester: Manchester
University Press 1986, that the discipline gradually lost any sense of its cultural
roots in European traditions and became an unintelligent and ultimately
unintelligible repetition of phrases which were losing their meaning. See
further, in the same sense, the author’s, The Evolution of International Legal
Scholarship in Germany during the Kaiserreich and the Weimarer Republik
(1871–1933), in: GYIL 50 (2007) 29–90. See also for a reflection on this
process as a wider phenomenon, James BoydWhite,WhenWords Lose Their
Meaning. Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language and Community,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984.
discipline”. A literal translation of Wissenschaft is probably the creation of
knowledge, through something approaching the idea of a discipline, which is
an organized pursuit of the same, through teaching and research of new
knowledge, by means of appropriate methods, meaning those accepted by the
discipline. The word “science” in English may possibly be taken to denote
particularly the empirically verifiable rigor that is supposed to attach to the
natural sciences.
However, the program is probably to be taken to be rather more histori-
cally specific than these general definitions might suggest. It has contrasted the
discipline with “confused philosophy” and “simple comment of the diploma-
tic practice”. Later when the program is discussing options for contributors it
returns to what it calls the fractures that mark the relationship between the
project of the scientification of international law and the other discourses still
tied to diplomatic practice or the natural law. It concludes the paragraph,
again in the same essentially prescriptive terms of the conference, with what
may be a single proposition, since it begins with the word “finally”, but which
may equally denote three tasks, since the propositions are broken with semi-
colons, while also beginning after a semi-colon:
“and finally, reconstruct the ‘positivist turn’ that characterizes also internatio-
nal law from the last decades of the nineteenth century; what were the sources
of this discipline, oscillating between law, philosophy and politics? How about
its autonomy?”
These last propositions leave very much open the possibility that, while there
was a positivist turn, put in inverted commas by the organizers, presumably to
signify that they recognize it to be a contested concept, the discipline to be still
oscillated between law, a word which is not put in inverted commas, and so is
presumably not a contested concept, philosophy – which was earlier designa-
ted as inherently confused, at least as practiced by presumably dilettante or
otherwise unscientific would be international lawyers – and politics. The last
if not final – since we have already had the word “final” at the beginning –
question is then whether international law is autonomous. Presumably this
last question follows from concerns about the oscillation identified in the
previous proposition.
I think that it is probably uncontested that normally the heralding of
international law as a science in the late 19th century is taken to mean the
routing of natural law, its elimination from thinking about international law.
Natural law has become the other for international lawyers. However, the
conference program itself suggests, as we have just seen, that this objective
was not achieved or maybe not even achievable. Therefore, the question arises
whether there might be another way to describe the remarkable changes that
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were taking place in the late 19th century. I would suggest that what
“Geschichte der Völkerrechtswissenschaft” should really be taken to signify
is the professionalization of international law. This has a special and
independent significance which may or may not run parallel to the attempts
by the “positivist turn” of international law to exterminate its other, natural
law or to distance itself from its equally odious ties to diplomatic practice.
The idea of professionalization, in the original project on
“Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Völkerrechts vom Kaiserreich bis zum
Nationalsozialismus” at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal Histo-
ry,3 will mean that very significant developments in international law can
themselves be attributable to the way that the profession of international
lawyers is itself organized. Therefore the discipline of international law needs
also to be understood in terms of how that discipline is organized. It is not
enough to look to the relationship between international law writings and
general political events and general cultural or more specifically philosophical
currents in international society. As long as the project has this additional aim
and does not itself claim any exclusive goal as to what has to be, in the end,
the fundamental character of international law – I will characterize any such
ambition as ideological, as such a word is taken to denote a negative attempt
to give an exclusive ideational foundation for something – I think it has to be
recognized that the project makes a fascinating addition to our knowledge of
international law. In particular it offers a radar screen into the minefields of
the discipline, which allows those wishing to make a career in international
law – the very essence of professionalization – to see what the hazards are they
have to face as they choose to give the discipline their own particular mark.
I propose to illustrate both the usefulness of the project, and, simultane-
ously, the futility of expecting it to produce a single ideological result in the
sense which I have just defined. I will do this, to use the language of academic
disciplines, by offering no more than what is understood as a review article of
two books, doctoral dissertations, which have been produced from, or in
open dialogic association with, the project. They are Frank Bodendiek,
Walther Schückings Konzeption der internationalen Ordnung. Dogmatische
Strukturen und ideengeschichtliche Bedeutung4 and Jochen von Bernstorff,
Der Glaube an das universale Recht. Zur Völkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens
und seiner Schüler.5
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3 “Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Völkerrechts vom Kaiserreich bis zum
Nationalsozialismus”, as prepared by Michael Stolleis for the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft (DFG) in 1996.
4 Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2001.
5 Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2001.
Where an intellectual activity ceases to be the work of solitary, even self-
supporting literati, and acquires at least some of the character of routinized,
or even institutionalized study, that is bound to have some influence on the
character of the intellectual activity, one could even ask how the hated and
despised others of international law, philosophy and diplomatic history were
changed in the late 19th century as they equally experienced the effects of the
expansion of university education in the context of the consolidation of the
European nation-states after 1870. Is the core of an intellectual activity
significantly affected by having to transmit aspects of it to a defined audience
of an inherently generational character, such as a student community? Can
one generalize about whether this type of activity affects the content of the
discipline? Clearly people have to be trained to be recognizable as teachers of
the discipline and this means, again, that criteria of excellence common to the
profession have to be worked out. However, could one seriously argue that
disciplines such as philosophy, history etc., are fundamentally altered by the
multiplication of centers of state funded university knowledge production and
transmission?
I think the answer has to be positive to some degree at least at particular
points in time – which do not exclude evolution – so that one has an agreed
content of intellectual activity that has to be in some measure routinized. So it
is worthwhile exploring how professionalism could lead, above all, to the
neglect of the “rough edges” of a discipline, to disregard of intrinsic and
apparently interminable controversies in favor of simple presentation of
practical matters, which are seen by society as immediately pressing. To some
degree this reflects the difficulties which Schücking experienced in his career.
Yet one has to explore at the same time how it is that, also in purely career
terms, he emerged at the very top of his profession. A crucial question is posed
through a reflection on Schücking’s life, in the context of the present
conference. It is whether and how career and institutional constraints affected
his research methods. With Kelsen, it is perhaps enlightening to see all of his
intellectual endeavors as determined by the fact that he thought he had to do
with international law only as a university discipline. His desire to dominate
this particular environment and force it into a single mode gains some
intelligibility in that context.
Walther Schücking
The particular fascination of Bodendiek’s academic biography of Schücking in
the present context is his description of how Schücking’s intellectual methods
and objects brought him into serious conflict with aspects of his national
institutional environment, but did not prevent his eventual success, both at
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home and abroad, at least until the Nazis assumption of power ended any
national activity. The essential points of Bodendiek’s work are that he can rely
upon extensive private papers and correspondence, the networking activities
of Schücking, the records of his university time in Marburg, at a Commercial
College in Berlin, the records of the German Society of International Law and
those of the Ministries of Education in Prussia, to piece together his fortunes.
He was recognized as an outstanding legal scholar from the very beginning.
However, he did suffer some career difficulties because he differed from many
of his German law colleagues about the appropriate type of academic activity
in which to engage. After the founding of the German Reich in 1871, it was
thought, following the positivist school of Paul Laband, the proper function
of the university public law professor was to delineate exactly what was the
state and identify what it had promulgated as law. To treat this material
logically and systematically was the most important to do for the university
teacher. International law as a specific discipline was, in any case, usually only
a small part of the teaching and research responsibility of German public law
professors, which remains the case today.
Schücking did not disagree in principle with the basic tenet of this positivist
school. However, he thought that by the beginning of the 20th century
Germany and the world were experiencing such rapid change that such an
approach for the academic lawyer as mere description of existing legislation
was too passive and did not exhaust his wider responsibility to society.
Schücking drew a very critical picture of the academic who remained in his
study (Fachgelehrte) and lost contact with real life.6 Looking outside the Law
Faculty in Marburg, his first Chair, to the need for a close exchange between
politics and Wissenschaft which should engage with contemporary political
problems, he relied upon the intellectual support of the neo-Kantian philoso-
phers in the same university, which was a leading centre for this essentially
liberal German philosophical movement. At the same time his Law colleagues
reacted by blocking the establishment of an International Law Seminar in
Marburg because they disapproved of his activities. These could include him
being seen as connected to his brave public stance in denouncing Prussian
government expropriations of Polish landed interests in the province of
Posen.7 Schücking was a solitary figure among German public law professors
in making this protest.
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At the theoretical level Schücking’s basic thesis, following Stammler, was
that the rapidly changing and conflictual political environment needed the
lawyer to work with a concept of justice, which would connect natural law
with the historicity of law, thereby restoring the connection between law and
philosophy.
Schücking could not see the point of any intellectual method, whether legal
positivism or historicism, which simply served to describe, with whatever
accuracy, what had actually happened, when the challenge was in fact to cope
with rapid and potentially dangerous change.8
It was obvious that very little of international society was regulated in the
usual public law sense by positive international law. However, the potential
for serious conflict in the last decade of the 19th and first decade of the 20th
century was great and increasing. Schücking did not work out a fully
developed philosophical system, but he felt a strong affinity to an idealist
republicanism which he took from Kant. An especially important party of this
heritage was the belief in the power of ideas and the belief that history was a
dynamic historical process, in which the challenge was to recognize and
harness the elements working positively for change.9 To manage change
peacefully one needed a concept of justice to balance and reconcile difference
and one needed agreement on the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes,
hence the importance of arbitration and exclusion of the use of force by states.
It was precisely because factual change was so fast and threatening that the
lawyers needed constantly to be coming up with new models and frameworks
to feed into the political process, with which they had to work constantly and
closely.
This was an unusual perspective for a lawyer to adopt and Bodendiek notes
that even as a enlightened colleague as Franz von Liszt did not agree with him.
Von Liszt thought the main function of the legal academic was expository and
the thinking out of new laws was the responsibility of the legislator. Legal
science should just record the legal practice.10 Pohl, Heilborn and others also
disagreed with Schücking. Legal doctrine should present legal facts, engage in
a constructive systematic analysis of them and conclude with a description of
what states were now willing to regard as valid against them in their relations
with other states.11 These jurists were positivists who were not neo-Hegelians
and did not dispute the legal character of international law. This was not a
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dispute between nationalists and cosmopolitans, but had to do precisely with
the nature of the intellectual responsibility of the Fachgelehrten.
Bodendiek explains Schücking’s unusual stance among his colleagues
partially in terms of his family background.12 He came from a literary family,
of artistic creativity which meant, in Bodendiek’s view, Schücking would not
have been lacking in the necessary amount of fantasy to be able to risk playing
with new types of concepts. The family itself was liberal and opposed to
Bismarck. He was educated by the left liberal Ludwig von Bar13 and while he
quickly became isolated from the rest of the Law Faculty in Marburg, he had
plenty of intellectual and social support from the equally left liberal neo-
Kantianism of the University as a whole and of the town of Marburg. Perhaps
hostility within the Faculty encouraged Schücking to look outside the univer-
sity. His very general commitment to the Kantian tendency of German
idealism included a belief that challenges had to made specifically to the
intellectual elites of Germany (die geistigen Eliten) to bring in a new era.14 To
achieve this he constantly quoted Kant. His belief in history as a dynamic
historical process did not amount to a fully worked out position on
philosophical questions.15 However, the absence of so much needed regula-
tion of international society necessitated something more than a strict legal
method. One had to think in terms of the organization of the world and that
required, in Schücking’s view (and it is central to Bodendiek’s thesis about
him) the profession to be able to imagine things quite differently from how
they are now – one has to come out of the swamp of the past into the heights
of the future. There is need for a modern international law, not in an
unalterable form as with Grotius but one coming out of the nature of things
(Natur der Sache). One had to look to a changeable natural law (Stammler),
to the ideas of pacifism (the origin of the idea that the world had to be
organized), as well as to imaginative reworking of the valid international law
institutions, such as came out of the Hague Conferences.16
What I wish to stress is not so much the details of Schücking’s arguments as
the contexts in which he presented them and the fortunes they enjoyed.17
Peace in the world is only going to come through a juridification of inter-
national relations. In a Kantian sense, some legal conception of international
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12 Ibid., 44–45.
13 Ibid., 48–49, with whom Schücking did his Habilitation in 1899 and started as
a Privatdozent with von Bar in Göttingen.
14 Ibid., 116 et seq.
15 Ibid., 119.
16 Ibid., 126–128.
17 Ibid., 156 et seq.
order is a condition of peace and freedom. So the central question is how to
use law as a means to prevent future wars. This requires a republican
organization of the world. This tended to drive Schücking to advocate and
claim there already existed – through the results of the Hague Conference – a
world confederation of states – based upon mutual compromise, recognizing
that the national idea was a strong as the idea of freedom and could not be
eradicated. Republicanism excludes individual state hegemony, but does not
try to rob states of their individuality. Instead, there are ordered relations on
the basis of equal rights. There had to be acculturation to compromise and a
command of law over war. Because of the strength of the national the solution
to conflict has to be a reconciliation of the national with the international.
Instead of a hegemonic leveling of difference, one has to retain respect for
national difference.
One has to convince people that the idea of state sovereignty has changed
its function. It is no longer necessary to protect communities from the Kaiser
and the Pope, but instead it should function as a legal competence which
communities possess to develop legal relations. However, treaties and arbitra-
tion are not enough.18 One needs more to stop wars, a comprehensive legal
“Genossenschaft” which encompasses all states in their whole existence,
actively building trust and making the outbreak of war less likely – a world
confederation of states.
Schücking built up his reputation shortly before the outbreak of the First
World War with his major work in 1908, The Organization of the World. He
openly acknowledged that the idea was coming from the pacifist movement
and particularly the work of Alfred H. Fried.19 Schücking’s ambition was to
add legal rigor and technical detail to general pacifist ideas. This led him to
offer analyses of the Hague Conference results, especially on arbitration, as a
budding confederation of states. His colleagues did not go along with his
analysis either as a description of confederation or as an ideal.
However, things changed with the outbreak of the First World War. With
all of his public campaigning and controversialism, Schücking was a national
and soon to be international figure.20 During the war he wrote texts for the
Chancellor Bethman Hollweg, such as Freedom of the Seas in Exchange for
Peace Guarantees, part of his philosophy that the war was pointless and that
a compromise peace without annexations should be concluded. He was
invited by the German Society of International Law to help draft a proposal
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for a league of states, when by now virtually all German international lawyers
had come around to agree with him that a confederation of states was
necessary. He went on to jointly write a commentary on the League Covent,
which even the most conservative of German international lawyers, Philip
Zorn praised for its ability to put its democratic and pacifist views to one side
in favour of proper juridical analysis. Yet Schücking opposed the Versailles
Treaty as not being a compromise peace – meaning a peace based upon
mutual understanding. By the late 1920s he had decided that the League
Covenant was a failure, because the idea of a confederation was not strong
enough to cope with the hegemonic presence of France and Britain. These
developments show how Schücking sought, with considerable success, to
influence the higher political echelons of his country and how he gradually
brought them with him. International legal discourse should be a central part
of the discourse of a democratic country’s place in world society.
A final note should concentrate on the precise consequences of these
activities for his career. In 1918 his work on International Legal Guarantees,
on how to build a confederation among states, attracted the attention of
Secretary of State, Matthias Erzberger in the last liberal government of the
Empire headed by Max von Baden. He publicly acknowledged to making a
close study of it. 21 The German Government and its Foreign Office Legal
Advisers drew on the study in 1919 for their proposal to the Versailles Peace
Conference. Yet in 1919 the support of Erzberger and the SPD in the Prussian
Landtag etc. were not enough to achieve Schücking’s appointment to a Chair
in Berlin. The Faculty rejected him officially on the ground that he lacked
“wissenschaftliche” qualifications. The Culture minister, Becker argued also
that one needed someone with the best competence in public law, which
included administrative law and church law.22 Schücking took instead a job
at a commercial college where he could teach no international law to law
students. Several years later he left Berlin for Kiel in 1926. Yet, during his time
in Berlin he was a member of the Reichstag and on the committee concerned
with publication of the archives of the war and also with considering the
question of German war guilt. He represented the unpopular view that
Germany shared responsibility for the outbreak of the war.23
At an international level his reputation was by now outstanding. In 1921
he was made an ordinary, i. e. full member of the Institute of International
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Law, where there were only two other Germans. He was the German ad hoc
judge of the PCIJ in the Wimbledon Case and the Schools in Upper Silesia
Dispute. In 1926 he was appointed to the Kuratorium (board of trustees) of
the Hague Academy, becoming the German judge on the PCIJ in 1930.24
As a brief, provisional conclusion to this part of my paper I would remark
that Schücking’s story qualifies for a very broad pleading for a definition of
professionalism which is not merely interdisciplinary as to method, but which
connects the academic profession directly with the wider political community.
Schücking’s efforts at this wider level were, ultimately, extremely successful,
but it may be that he lost out at the narrower level of establishing a place for
his methods and goals within the Law Faculties. The latter not only resisted
his ideas. They also blocked him for most of his career from any effective
teaching of new generations of students, including those who might have
become his disciplines and carried on his message. He left no definitive
textbook or monograph about international legal methodology, which could
have had a lasting influence on the Law Faculties and, despite his fame, he
does not enjoy a prominent place in German international law science, as
distinct from the impact, if ultimately transitory and marginal, that he had on
Germany’s approaches to world governance.
Hans Kelsen
Perhaps the ambitions of Hans Kelsen correspond most closely to the idea of a
“positivist turn” which has as its primary aim the “Verwissenschaftlichung”
of the discipline of international law. I think von Bernstorff’s critical ex-
position of Kelsen’s thoughts helps to show the strengths, and, in my view, the
circularity not only of this exercise but also of something which has grown
out of it at the present time, what I would call the liberal constitutionalist
movement in international law. Kelsen’s aims, in von Bernstorff’s exposition,
have to be seen primarily in an academic context. They are a response to a
nationalist sentiment in Germany and also, eventually, Austria Hungary,
which would treat the sovereignty of the state, as the institutionalized nation,
above any, in Kelsen’s view, objective legal standard. International law was
nothing more than external public law, always likely to be trumped by appeals
to the supreme national interest or whatever other label, be it vital interests,
inherent sovereignty.25 The public lawyer in the university who might regard
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himself as the “wizard” of this mythical Apollo worshipped as the State,
would try to appeal to a hotchpotch of political and ethical prejudices to
judge quite capriciously when this trumping should take place. So it is
possible to see, as von Bernstorff presents him, Kelsen as primarily engaged
with the social reality of institutionalized, state-directed learning in the form
of the university professor of public law. It was crucial to follow up what was
happening in educational institutions, where future generations were being
trained to see the State as a necessary block on excessive attempts at
constructions of an international society.
Von Bernstorff stresses the Austro-Hungarian context of the model of law,
whether public or international, that Kelsen wished to develop. His country
was obviously not nationally homogenous, but instead a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, simply pluralist world, which it was appropriate to govern with a
culturally neutral concept of law as a rule issued by a delegated authority, for
the purpose of the most flexible possible form of social engineering. No
possibilities of development, particularly towards international organization,
should be a priori excluded. Since Kelsen’s context, unlike Schücking’s, is
entirely the forum of university education, his desire is to ensure that
generations of future officials in state-run educational institutions, acquire
as a central feature of their education, a professional responsibility to remain
politically, ethically or otherwise in terms of whatever weltanschaulich
neutral, and simply accept responsibility for the implementation of law.
While Kelsen insisted absolutely upon the autonomy of law, his was not a
normative theory in the sense that he believed laws could or should contain so
much detail that they could be automatically applied to factual situations.
Instead his governing ideas were those of a hierarchy of delegation of
authority of decision-making, ideally suited for those who were to become
functionaries in administration, at whatever level.26 This theory was known
among Austro-Hungarian administrative lawyers as a Stufenbau-Lehre, the
concept of law as a hierarchical ladder. In formal terms the traditional concept
of sovereignty meant that point or stage which could not be said to be
themselves derived from any point or stage above it. Logically every hierarchy
had to have such a point, but equally logically, it could not itself have its
authority derived from within the hierarchy. One had to suppose, or hypothe-
size a meta-systemic point which somehow validated the hierarchical order.
With this, admittedly very serious qualification, Kelsen thought it possible to
talk of the sovereignty of the Law.
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Kelsen was not alone among German speaking public lawyers in his search
for an objective standard for the specific problem for public lawyers posed by
the need for those of an internationalist or cosmopolitan tendency, to ground
securing the existence of international law beyond the caprices of the turn of
the 19th and 20th century European nation-state. Jellinek, Triepel and others
came up with doctrines of “Selbstverpflichtungslehre” and “Vereinbarungs-
theorie” to counter the neo-Hegelian – for instance held by the so-called
Bonner Schule led by Philipp Zorn, that a State could change its will with
respect to an obligation if supreme national interest required it.27 In develo-
ping responses to these arguments Kelsen can only be understood in terms of
“Wissenschaftsgeschichte”. At no point does Kelsen engage, as Schücking
does, with the actual tensions of international society and with questions of
what forms of national passion or conflicts of interest could lead to war.
Instead, Kelsen is concerned to develop a critique of his own academic
colleagues which conforms to what he sees as necessary for the development
of an appropriate – i.e. political prejudice free – concept of Law.
While Jellinek, Triepel, and indeed Schücking may have had the same
ideological orientation as Kelsen – and von Bernstorff stresses at the begin-
ning of his book, the possibility of a tension between the Pure Theory of law
and Kelsen’s own undoubted political orientation – Kelsen sees their theories
as still caught up in too close association with the State considered factually
rather than legally. Yet, in Kelsen’s view, as interpreted by von Bernstorff, any
attempt to view the state in a supposedly sociological way, opens the door to
the crass identification of the public lawyer, through his political prejudices,
with the projection of the nation-state as an ethnically homogenous Leviathan
whose collectivist lusts have to be satisfied. So it is impossible to ask, with
Jellinek, whereabouts in the collective mass psychology of the State one was
to find empirical evidence of the process of “Selbstverpflichtung”. Kelsen’s
argument here was to have serious implications for his view of the subjective
element of the usual definition of general customary international law. He was
also opposed to Triepel’s combination of two such collective entities self-
obliging wills into the fusion of an international “Vereinbarung”, as some-
thing more than mere contracts among individual states. The theory was a
mere fictional transfer to international relations, of Rousseau’s political
theory of the Contrat Social.
Instead, in Kelsen’s view, one had to go to the root of the problem, the
anthropomorphic concept of the state as a super-human collective, a later day
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Apollo, of such a mythical, irrational power, that no intellectual, never mind
emotional, resistance to it was conceivable. This social reality had to be
exercised from legal science. Kelsen’s solution was simply to insist that
primary legal subjects of international law were those entities to which the
international legal order directly addressed its norms. The State is therefore
that entity within a particular geographical space to which the unified, and
therefore international, hierarchy of norms delegates certain competences
which it, in turn, delegates to entities subordinate to it, regional authorities
or the judiciary, to take two examples.28
In that case where was the top of the hierarchy of legal norms? Kelsen has
already decided that the inevitable problem of the infinite regress of authority
through ever rising levels of delegation, is to be overcome with the hypothesis
of the Grundnorm. The question for international law is to choose such a
norm. Kelsen latched onto the idea that pacta sunt servanda is an objective
norm of the international legal order which has a status distinct from the
status of particular rules of law about the conclusion of agreements. He
describes this rule in terms that states behave customarily as if the rule pacta
sunt servanda is to be observed. This makes out of the rule somehow a
command standing above the will of individual states which they have to obey
because they are subordinate to it. The essential idea of Law as objective to
Kelsen means that it has the character of a command, and there represents a
reality which it is beyond the possibility for an individual legal subject to
please itself whether it will continue to accept as an obligation something it
consented to freely at one point in time.29
Kelsen himself is aware that there is a contradiction driving his whole
theory, which rests in his own cosmopolitan or internationalist preferences as
against what he takes to be subjectivist nationalist prejudice. As he is
committed to the idea of the unity of all legal orders in one, he feels compelled
to explain exactly the relationship of the national to the international in terms
of his theory of delegation. As an international lawyer, he has no difficulty
claiming that pacta sunt servanda is the supreme norm and that somewhere
down the hierarchy states, as primary subjects of international law, have
norms of that order addressed to them directly. However, he accepts that it
also possible for each individual state, assuming for the sake of argument that
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one can talk of such things, regards itself as constituting the finalGrundnorm,
so that all other state legal orders and the international legal order can be
taken as delegated from itself. Kelsen expects this idea to be regarded as
absurd. So, he is effectively intending to compel people to accept the inter-
nationalist Grundnorm as the more reasonable. 30
I believe that the idea of the Grundnorm has not itself proved to be the
problem with Kelsen’s theory. Indeed it makes it especially attractive to the
whole idea of professionalism, which requires that the would-be professional
person need only be concerned with the internal limits and integrity of what
he or she is doing. Professionalism does not require the individual to have, as
it were, the whole picture, i.e. not merely a grasp of the discipline but also of
its actual soc-political role and its relation to other disciplines. He is simply
concerned with the internalization of the requirements of his own field. The
Grundnorm can serve as a more abstract version of H.L.A. Hart’s so-called
internal perspective on the Law. The officials applying the Law think, as
officials, that they are applying rules which they ought to apply. This
perspective is contrasted with the so-called external perspective, for instance,
of the criminal or the uncultivated foreigner, who can merely see patterns of
behavior of officials, which may produce results serving certain persons’
material interests, but to which no normative force is attributed. For those
within the profession the external perspective does not matter as long as the
system continues to function.31 It is probably not possible to criticize
professionalism head on. It feeds the needs of security of modern society that
for every problem there can be found people who “know what needs doing”
because they are “experts”. The presentation of Schücking’s approach to
international law was intended to challenge this perspective.32
However, it is possible to challenge Kelsen in other ways. I will point to at
least three. Von Bernstorff challenges the fetish which Kelsen is inevitably
making out of the three letter word which is Law. In the true spirit of the
discipline of Wissenschaftsgeschichte, he shows that Kelsen is in fact relying
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upon a whole erudition in international law literature, which in fact belongs
to the period of supposedly confused philosophy. Kelsen’s idea of the essential
unity of Law is a natural law idea which he has taken from the late Spanish
scholastics. Indeed one of his first works is on Dante Allegre’s vision of the
cosmos. So Kelsen’s vision of what can be achieved through the neutrality of
Law is a spiritual one rooted in the European tradition that sees in Law, as a
three letter word with the first letter as a capital, a force which presumably
Kelsen himself would have to admit is mythical, although von Bernstorff
simply says that the idea is of a natural law character, which presumably
means it has an objectively constraining force beyond the supposedly inevit-
ably arbitrary nature of individual choices or decisions. Von Bernstorff shows
in convincing detail, particularly from his discussion of Kelsen’s 1922 work
Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts, that Kelsen
draws very closely in a number of respects from Wolff’s theory of the Civitas
Maxima and from von Kaltenborn’s Kritik des Völkerrechts, published in
1847. The former is precisely the international order which Kelsen thinks has
to be logically posited as a necessary logical framework to ensure the
coordinated of the freedom of independent states. The latter provides the
whole vocabulary of the subjective and the objective in the relations of
individual states with international society. Von Kaltenborn believes that
the subjective and the objective are reconciled in a single cosmic whole. It is
these visions which infuse the spirit of the idealism which Kelsen attaches to
the concept of Law. In other words the dichotomy between the philosophical
and the professional is historical false. There is no rupture, only a change of
language and style.33
One aspect of the natural law tradition which Kelsen draws upon,
specifically through von Kaltenborn’s Kritik, is the just war theory. Kelsen
uses this specifically to distinguish the purely legal character of norms. This
comes from the presence of a sanction. The Law stipulates that in specific
circumstances (Tatsbestände) a sanctioning norm applies. The legal sanction
distinguishes law from morality or the politically desirable. Such a sanction
also exists in international law, through the decentralized system of sanctions
represented by reprisals. This argument of Kelsen revives the just war theory,
going back to Grotius and the Scholastics, because it harnesses the use of force
to responses to prior legal violations, and to repression of or punishment of
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these violations.34 In the absence of compulsory adjudication, which Kelsen
favored, his whole line of argument is open to all the traditional positivist
objections about the subjectivity of sovereign state assessments of the nature
or extent of legal violations. In his later writings in the 1950s Kelsen
recognized this.35
I wish to conclude with a critique of Kelsen’s approach to the state. Triepel,
Morgenthau and Arangio Ruiz have all pointed out that it makes no sense to
talk of the international legal order delegating legal competence or authority
to the state, if the factual reality is that the state precedes international society.
The word “precedes” may appear to some to be masquerading as sociological
or historical term, when it is in fact metaphysical – and so, supposedly
ephemeral- but these authors are simply asking for historical evidence as to
what point in time an international society granted anything to a state, and
whether that society really continues to be able to impose anything upon a
state. Kelsen’s own definition of what international law accepts as the state in
fact gives away any argument he might have – for instance from constructivist
theory – that state and international society mutually constitute one ano-
ther.36 He accepts that a state is, for the purpose of international law, any
entity which through revolution or a coup, reaches power and establishes
effective control over a territory and a population. This acceptance of
Jellinek’s famous Drei-Elemente-Lehre is an endorsement of classical
positivism’s doctrine of the juridical power of the factual. It is
“Wissenschaftsgeschichte” which can expose how Kelsen, having set himself
a meta-legal goal in the realm of legal theory, then develops it in particular
branches of so-called legal science, such as international law, by simply
adopting lock, stock and barrel, existing concepts and dressing them up in
his new language.37
However, Kelsen is genuinely hostile to the turn of the 20th century state
and its public law priests and I think this has finally implications for aspects of
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the sources of international law and particularly for any hope of a vibrant
relationship between international law and the second other of the scientifica-
tion of international law, diplomatic practice. Kelsen has systematically
rejected in his analysis of Jellinek’s work, what he regards as the sociological
theory of the state. As von Bernstorff points out, Kelsen’s primary fear is the
public international lawyer as pseudo-intellectual, bringing his own confused
prejudices about the ethics of politics to bear on evaluations of the behavior of
his own or other national states. Kelsen wishes to exclude the possibility of
evaluation of state practice by international lawyers. He excludes the subjec-
tive element from the definition of general customary international law. He
also excludes as speculative and subjective the notion of general customary
law resting upon tacit or implied consent of states. All such notions allow
unreliable evaluations by so-called outstanding international law publicists.
Instead, Kelsen insists that the international judiciary should be accorded the
sole authority to declare what is customary international law. He believes
himself confirmed that the World Court does not provide evidences of the
subjective element of opinio juris. In other words, Kelsen carries his loathing
for his academic colleagues in the German-Austrian university world to the
point where he abolishes the whole idea of Völkerrechtswissenschaft and with
it, the whole idea that international law somehow evolves out of the practice
of states. Instead, we have to accept the task of legal science as being that of
analyzing the law making jurisprudence of the World Court.38
Kelsen contradicts the self-understanding of positive international lawyers,
as enshrined in the Statute of the ICJ, article 38. The practice of states
accepted as law, is the primary source of international law, which the ICJ has
repeatedly insisted, must include the subjective element of opinio juris.
However, this is not the primary point I wish to make. My feeling is that
there is real genius in Kelsen in managing to incorporate in elegant language
how the overwhelming majority of the international law profession see
themselves, as a profession, commentators on judicial practice. I think Kelsen
does somehow brilliantly encapsulate the present mood of the profession.
However, that should serve, in my view, to justify taking him as a focal point
for questioning the present prejudices of the profession, and above all, its
excuses for intellectual laziness for which Kelsen’s above all rhetorical
brilliance serves as an alibi. I think there is no reason to make Kelsen’s
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anxieties about the character of Germanic nationalism in Hitler’s Vienna and
Munich as a fetish, for all time, to remove intelligible understanding of the
relationships of national communities with one another and with an over-
arching concept of international community. It might also be added that
Kelsen’s own immersion in neo-Kantian and more particularly Wittgenstein-
ian logical positivist critique of the objective possibilities of ethics are not to
be taken to have frozen endeavours in this area for all time. To accept Kelsen’s
philosophical theories as eternally valid is just one more mark of the
intellectual laziness of the profession, a laziness of which he was never
susceptible. Forays into the worlds of diplomacy and ethics were considered
reasonable and possible undertakings by Kelsen’s own mentor von Kalten-
born, and also by his equally worthy contemporary, Schücking. However, if
one accepts that challenge, then one is once again, as an international lawyer,
thrown out of the supposedly pure world of law as an autonomous discipline.
That pure world gives a spurious identity to an independent, because
parasitical, profession – mere commentators on judicial and other institution-
al decisions. The international lawyer is thrown back into the murky worlds
of diplomatic history and ethics in international relations. In any event the
meta-juridical character of the state comes back to haunt and deconstruct
state centered international law and all that it creates.39
Conclusion
My very brief conclusion to this survey of the contributions of Bodendiek and
von Bernstorff to Völkerrechtswissenschaftsgeschichte is that the history of
how international legal arguments develop within the institutions of the
discipline is an essential element in an understanding of international law.
However, it is only one element in the way of understanding the subject. As
for the intellectual content of the discipline, its methods, ideals and tasks, I
believe these two examples or illustrations demonstrate that international law
is, like every other human endeavor, going around in circles. At present, the
profession is inclined to fantasize its existence in the terms of Kelsen’s elegant
rhetoric, but I believe that the increasing power of critical international legal
studies and of the so-called new scholarship in international law points the
way to a renewed immersion of the profession in the murky interdisciplinary
worlds of diplomatic politics, international ethics and perhaps even political
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theology. This is, after all, where international law began in the 16th and 17th
centuries.
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